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Совместный семинар ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ, объединённый с Семинаром НИУ ВШЭ по политической экономии: Филипп Ганьепен (Парижская школа экономики при Парижском университете 1), “Full versus binary menus: What are the welfare gains?” (co-authored with David Martimort)

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  • Шаболовка 26-4, к. 4322

Совместный семинар ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ, объединённый с Семинаром НИУ ВШЭ по политической экономии: Филипп Ганьепен (Парижская школа экономики при Парижском университете 1), “Full versus binary menus: What are the welfare gains?” (co-authored with David Martimort)

16 мая, 17:00 (Шаболовка 26-4, к. 4322). Совместный семинар ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ, объединённый с Семинаром НИУ ВШЭ по политической экономии: Филипп Ганьепен (Парижская школа экономики при Парижском университете 1), “Full versus binary menus: What are the welfare gains?” (co-authored with David Martimort). Регистрация на семинар (до 10:00 16 мая).

Аннотация:

This study focuses on the contractual relationships between public authorities and operators. The new theory of regulation suggests that, in a situation of asymmetric information, the principal may propose the agent a complex menu of linear contracts in order to maximize social welfare. While this practice is well understood from a theoretical point of view, it is di fficult to implement in practice; instead, simple binary menus are frequently used in reality. Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) have suggested through a theoretical exercise that simple binary menus capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the full optimal menu (at least 75%). A  first goal of our paper is to challenge these results empirically in the particular case of the local public sector. Our preliminary results are much more pessimistic than those obtained by these authors. As a by-product, we investigate whether the major source of bene fit in contract design comes either from better designing cost reimbursement rules or extending contract length.